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INTRODUCTION 
 
Building 247-F at SRS was a roughly 110,000 ft2 
two-story facility designed and constructed during the 
height of the cold war naval buildup to provide additional 
naval nuclear fuel manufacturing capacity in early 1980s.   
The building layout is shown in Fig. 1.  A photograph of 
the facility is shown in Fig. 2.  The manufacturing process 
employed a wide variety of acids, bases, and other 
hazardous materials.  As the cold war wound down, the 
need for naval fuel declined.  Consequently, the facility 
was shut down and underwent initial deactivation.  All 
process systems were flushed with water and drained 
using the existing process drain valves.   However, since 
these drains were not always installed at the lowest point 
in piping and equipment systems, a significant volume of 
liquid remained after initial deactivation was completed in 
1990. At that time, a non-destructive assay of the process 
area identified approximately 17 (+/- 100%) kg of 
uranium held up in equipment and piping. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Building 247-F layout. 
 
The facility was placed in Surveillance and 
Maintenance mode until 2003, when the decision was 
made to perform final deactivation and then 
decommission the facility.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Building 247-F prior to deactivation, seen from the 
southwest. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTUAL WORK 
 
The disposition of building 247-F was managed as 
the 247-F D&D Project.  As the name indicates, the 
project scope included both a deactivation phase and a 
decommissioning phase.  
Disposition of excess facilities at SRS is managed 
under the WSRC Facility Disposition Manual, 1C. [1] 
This manual defines activities necessary to deactivate and 
decommission facilities in accordance with DOE Guides 
G 430.1-3 and G 430.1-4. [2], [3] 
 
Deactivation Phase of Project 
 
Deactivation is defined as the process of placing a 
contaminated excess facility in a stable condition to 
minimize risks to workers, the public and the 
environment.  As required, a deactivation project manager 
was assigned and a deactivation project plan was        
prepared. [1], [2]    
Preparation of this plan involved: 
· Identification of residual hazards in the facility 
· Definition of project goals and objectives 
· Determination of deactivation endpoints 
· Development of a scope of work, cost estimate 
and schedule to achieve the selected endpoints 
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Hazards expected to be encountered during 
deactivation were identified and evaluated using the 
following standard SRS methods by teams of 
knowledgeable project personnel led by Washington 
Safety Management Solutions, the hazards assessment 
sub-contractor for WSRC: 
· Consolidated Hazard Analysis 
· Auditable Safety Analysis 
· Deactivation Fire Hazards Analysis 
· Hazards Assessment Document 
The above analyses generally concluded the risks 
resulting from 247-F deactivation activities were mainly 
borne by the local worker as result of exposure to residual 
process materials during equipment and piping removal.  
In contrast, risks to offsite receptors were insignificant.   
The SRS excess facility disposition program uses a 
graded approach to requirements whereby the level of 
effort and commitment of resources is commensurate with 
the size and complexity of the facility. The measure of a 
facility’s importance to safety is its facility hazard 
category as defined in DOE-STD-1027-92. The hazardous 
material inventory available for dispersion from the 
facility varies with the hazard category, with Nuclear 
facilities being the most hazardous, Radiological or 
Chemical facilities moderately hazardous, and Other 
Industrial or clean facilities being the least hazardous.   
Nuclear facilities are further subdivided into Hazard 
Categories 1, 2, and 3, the highest to the lowest risk, 
based on inventory.  
 
Deactivation Endpoints Development 
 
The Department of Energy (DOE) requires 
development of detailed deactivation endpoints for 
facility systems, spaces and major equipment is    
required. [1] 
The DOE/EM-0318 manual describes two methods 
for determining these end points; the “hierarchical 
method”, which is to be used for large or complex 
facilities, and the “checklist method”, which is suitable 
for smaller and simpler facilities. [4] 
The “hierarchical method” end points development 
method is normally used for Nuclear Facilities of Hazard 
Category 2 or higher.  All other facilities must have end 
points determined by the “checklist method”.   
Due to the low inventory of radiological constituents 
prior to deactivation, building 247-F met the criteria for a 
categorization as a Radiological facility.  Consequently, 
the checklist method of developing endpoints was used. 
 
Scope of Work, Cost, and Schedule Development  
 
In order to effectively achieve the desired endpoints, 
the 247-F facility and associated structures were 
partitioned into approximately 100 geographical zones.  
The main process area, which was historically known as 
the process core contained 82 of these zones. 
A work breakdown structure (WBS) was developed 
with four main deactivation work elements. 
· Baseline preparation - project site setup, zone 
deactivation sequencing, and waste management 
and safety evaluations 
· Asset and equipment removal from the non-core 
zones 
· Equipment removal from the core zones 
· Disposal of 501 legacy shipping containers 
found in the facility 
 
Regulatory Approval 
 
The South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (SCDHEC) has primary 
environmental regulatory authority for all activities at 
SRS.  Like any other activity at SRS, the deactivation of 
building 247-F had to be executed in such a way that 
planned and unplanned releases to land, air and surface 
water were within the approved site permit limits.  Other 
than these general regulatory requirements, SCDHEC has 
no specific regulatory authority over deactivation 
activities at SRS facilities.   
During deactivation, releases to air and surface water 
complied with existing permits issued by SCDHEC.  
During deactivation of the 247-F complex, all radioactive, 
hazardous, mixed and sanitary waste was removed from 
the facilities and disposed of per the appropriate 
regulations. 
 
Decommissioning Phase 
 
By July 2005, essentially all the radiological 
inventory was removed from the facility.  The hazard 
category of the facility was then downgraded form 
Radiological to Other Industrial.   This action had major 
ramifications for the management of decommissioning 
phase of the project as described in the section below. 
All the deactivation endpoints were completed by 
September 2005, allowing the project to transition to the 
decommissioning phase. 
 
Regulatory Approval 
 
DOE has decided on the use of Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) Non-Time-Critical Removal Action as the 
approach for decommissioning SRS facilities, using the 
tailored process negotiated with the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), unless circumstances at the 
facility make it inappropriate. DOE Savannah River 
(DOE-SR) is the lead agency for CERCLA actions at 
SRS.  DOE-SR, SCDHEC, and EPA, have agreed that 
DOE-SR will perform decommissioning work under its 
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lead agency authority. SRS will seek regulatory 
participation in this process through concurrence of the 
Facility Decommissioning Evaluation (FDE) and the 
Decommissioning Project Final Report (DPFR).  
Concurrence means that the information provided is 
acceptable to the SCDHEC and EPA.   Concurrence by 
the regulators is provided in writing for each document.  
DOE and the regulators work collaboratively to resolve 
any document comments.  If comments cannot be 
resolved, DOE may elect to continue work execution, as 
planned.  The regulators may elect to use the SRS Federal 
Facility Agreement Site Evaluation Process to address 
unresolved comments. 
A 22 step process is defined, which is taken as the 
model for decommissioning facilities at SRS. [3] 
The 22 step framework for decommissioning is 
applied differently, depending on the facility hazard 
category.  The degree of complexity and rigor ranges 
from the Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) 
Model for Nuclear facilities, to the Streamlined Model for 
Radiological and Chemical facilities, to the Integrated 
Sampling Model for Other Industrial facilities to the 
Simple Model for Clean facilities.  
In general, decommissioning of Nuclear facilities 
Hazard Category 2 or 3 will be conducted as a CERCLA 
non-time-critical removal action. This is accomplished by 
the preparation of an EE/CA, as prescribed by CERCLA 
regulations. The EE/CA is put into the public record by 
DOE-SR, and review and comments are solicited from 
stakeholders. 
For facilities that are classified Radiological, 
Chemical (High Hazard), or Chemical (Low Hazard), 
decommissioning will be accomplished in a streamlined 
manner, using simplified documentation that is similar to 
what is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
for commercial nuclear facilities. An Analysis of 
Decommissioning Alternatives is prepared, which 
addresses the same evaluation factors as an EE/CA, but in 
a more simplified manner. 
Facilities classified as Other Industrial hazard 
category are those that have a small amount of 
contamination arising from their operational history. 
These follow the Integrated Sampling Model. That model 
is identical to the Simple Model described below, except 
for the requirement to perform a final verification 
characterization to demonstrate that residual 
contamination is within acceptable limits. 
For clean facilities, the only safety risks associated 
with the decommissioning are risks to the workers that 
arise from standard industrial hazards. The same is true 
for facilities in the Other Industrial hazard category, 
unless there have been releases to the environment from 
the facility, or it had been downgraded from a higher 
hazard category. In that case, the project may be required 
to follow the Streamlined model described above, i.e. an 
Analysis of Decommissioning Alternatives. 
The specific model to be followed by a project is 
determined by the FDE.   After deactivation of the 
buildings comprising the 247-F complex with resultant 
inventory removal and hazard category downgrade, FDEs 
were prepared for all the buildings.   The FDEs 
determined that building 247-F itself and a supporting 
chemical process building, 247-7F would be 
decommissioned following the Integrated Sampling 
Model.  Since all other buildings were Clean, 
uncontaminated facilities, they would follow the Simple 
Model.  The documents were transmitted to the regulators 
for concurrence per the above agreement. 
The decommissioning end state of the buildings that 
comprised the 247-F complex required that the structures 
be demolished to the building slab.  South Carolina 
regulation 61-86.1, Standards of Performance for 
Asbestos Projects, mandates that the owner/operator of a 
building to be demolished provide SCDHEC with written 
notice of intent to demolish at least 10 working days in 
advance of the demolition. 
Decommissioning activities were subject to the same 
limitations on environmental releases as described for 
deactivation activities.  Decommissioning waste was also 
subject to the same management and disposal 
requirements described in that section for deactivation 
wastes. 
During decommissioning, releases to air and surface 
water complied with existing SCDHEC permits.   After 
decommissioning, a single DPFR for the 247-F complex 
was transmitted to the regulators for concurrence. 
During demolition all facilities were demolished to 
slab.   The demolition waste was removed from the site 
and disposed of per the appropriate regulations. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Building 247-F after decommissioning, seen from 
perspective as in Fig. 2.  Note location of yellow bollards 
in both figures. 
 
RESULTS/LESSONS LEARNED 
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The following lessons were learned as a result of the 
D&D of building 247-F.  Successful D&D of a major 
radiochemical process building requires significant 
upfront planning by a team of knowledgeable personnel 
led by a strong project manager.  The level of uncertainty 
and resultant risk to timely, cost effective project 
execution was found to be high.  Examples of the types of 
problems whose scope and consequent impact on cost and 
schedule include: 
 
Unknown Extent of Undrained Equipment  
 
Low level and sanitary waste acceptance criteria do 
not allow free liquids in waste containers.  These liquids, 
which are often corrosive, must be safely removed from 
the equipment before it is loaded to waste containers. 
Drained liquids must be properly managed, often as 
hazardous or mixed waste.  Tapping and draining of 
process lines is a dangerous operation, which must be 
performed carefully.  The temptation to become 
complacent when breaking into lines is great.  Incidents of 
personnel exposure to liquids during draining are likely. 
Though records from the initial 1990 deactivation led 
early work planners to assume the facility was cold, dark 
and dry.  This turned out to be a poor assumption.  Work 
instructions were modified to require that engineers 
evaluate each of several hundred process lines to identify 
the low point, where a tap and drain system could be 
installed to allow positive verification that the line was 
empty before the line was cut for removal. 
 
Mold Hazards   
 
During the period when 247-F building was shut 
down, roof leaks had developed, allowing rain water to 
enter the building, which provided an environment for 
mold growth.  Sampling confirmed the presence of 
Stachybotrys chartarum, a toxic indoor mold that grows 
on wet cellulosic material, such as drywall paper.  D&D 
workers in areas where this hazard was identified were 
required to where proper personal protective equipment, 
which complicated work execution.   
 
Uniquely Hazardous Chemicals 
 
Discovery of the potential presence of uniquely 
hazardous chemicals such as shock sensitive compounds 
and toxic uranium hexafluoride became issues which 
required investigation and special handling strategies.  
Team access to subject matter experts, who could quickly 
provide the required guidance for safe material handling, 
was critical to keeping the project on schedule. 
 
Mechanical and Electrical Isolation   
 
In old legacy facilities, it is possible that the D&D 
workers will be exposed to undocumented energy sources 
such as energized electrical conductors and pipes 
containing hazardous materials that originate outside the 
boundaries of the facility.  Significant effort must be 
expended on adequate mechanical and electrical isolation. 
 
Waste Management and Disposal  
 
Waste management must be carefully planned.  The rate 
of waste generation as the facility is converted from a 
structure to waste can frequently exceed the D&D team’s 
resources to characterize, package, store and transport the 
waste to a disposal facility in a timely manner.  This can 
lead to schedule delays and/or increased project cost. [1] 
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